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Abstract 
This paper considers a problem posed implicitly by comparing a basic assumption 
typically used in quantitative analyses of cost growth of major defense acquisition programs 
(MDAPs) with that used in David L. McNicol, Acquisition Policy, Cost Growth, and 
Cancellations of Major Defense Acquisition Programs, IDA Report R-8396, September 2018 
(hereafter Acquisition Policy). An analysis in the traditional mold mainly uses program 
characteristics (such as the maturity of key technologies) to explain cost growth. Acquisition 
Policy instead uses a categorical variable for funding climate, categorical variables marking 
major changes in acquisition policy, and measures of program duration. At first glance, 
these two approaches seem to adopt radically different theories of the causes of cost growth 
in MDAPs. In fact, they do not. The paper demonstrates this by deriving the model of 
Acquisition Policy from a more complete model in which the traditional model is a structural 
equation. In terms of the more complete model, that of Acquisition Policy is the reduced 
form representation of the traditional model. 
Introduction 
I wrote this paper to answer a question I was asked after a presentation I made to 
the 15th Annual Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Acquisition Research Symposium 
(McNicol, 2018b). My presentation concerned a model that related cost growth on major 
defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) to changes in acquisition policy, funding climate 
(which is a proxy for the intensity of competition among MDAPs for funding at Milestone 
[MS] B), and measures of program duration. The question asked was: Why did you not 
include as explanatory variables any program characteristics—for example, the degree of 
concurrency between Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) and 
procurement? I had anticipated this question and had an answer, but it was clear to me as I 
gave it that my answer was inadequate. On reflection, I concluded that I had not fully 
thought through the issue. This paper is the remedy offered.  
The following section identifies relevant previous studies, and states in a general 
form a model in which program characteristics are used to explain cost growth. The Funding 
Climate-Policy Model section briefly sketches the model of McNicol (2018b). The next 
section, A More Complete Model and the Reduced Form Relationship, uses a more 
complete high-level model of cost growth on MDAPs to show that the Program Funding 
Climate-Policy Model is drawn from an underlying theory consistent with analyses that 
employ program characteristics to explain cost growth. The final section states my revised 
and, I hope much improved, answer to the question that led to this paper. 
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The Program Characteristics Model of Cost Growth 
During the 1960s and 1970s, several papers produced by the RAND Corporation 
considered whether the changes in acquisition policy and process made by Robert 
McNamara in the early 1960s, and further changes introduced by David Packard in July 
1969, had improved MDAP outcomes, particularly with regard to cost growth (Dews et al., 
1979; Perry, 1975; Perry et al., 1971; Perry et al., 1969). Perry et al. (1971) contained a 
section on the causes of cost growth; it attributed cost growth to three factors—technical 
uncertainty, scope change, and cost estimating error (see also Srull, 1998, Chapter 1).1 
These papers did not suggest that program characteristics were causes of cost growth. 
It is unclear when or why thinking shifted, but the idea that cost growth of MDAPs 
can to a large extent be explained by program characteristics seems to have entered the 
literature through two studies that appeared in the early 1990s—Tyson et al. (1992) and 
Drezner et al. (1993). Tyson et al. (1992) is cast as an evaluation of the effects on cost 
growth and schedule slips of six policy changes, each of which is embodied in a program 
characteristic. Drezner et al. (1993) states that they are using program characteristics (and 
also changes in DoD-level funding) to explain cost growth. Each of these studies took the 
program characteristics they considered as a given. In contrast, Tyson, Harmon, and Utech 
(1994) attempted to derive from the analysis the set of characteristics that are most 
important for cost growth. Lorell, Payne, and Mehta (2017) provided a clear and compelling 
study with a broadly similar intent. 
The following are representative examples of the program characteristics linked to 
cost growth by studies that have appeared since the mid-1990s: 
 Realism of the MS B EMD schedule 
 The maturity of the technologies employed 
 Whether the program involved a full-scale prototype prior to MS B 
 The degree of concurrency between development and production 
 The appropriateness of the contract type used 
 Whether program requirements are technically feasible and remain stable 
 Funding stability 
 Whether the MS B cost estimate is realistic 
 Test assets in the program 
 The amount of computer code that will be reused (i.e., taken from a legacy 
system) 
 The overhead rate 
Until fairly recently, no two studies adopted (or derived) the same set of program 
characteristics as the main causes of cost growth. Since 2010, however, root cause 
analyses sponsored by the Office of Program Assessment and Root Cause Analyses 
                                            
 
 
1 Perry and his colleagues thought that cost estimating errors were by a considerable margin the least 
important of the three sources of cost growth they identified. In 1970, David Packard, then Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, identified unrealistically optimistic MS B cost estimates as the main source of 
cost growth.  
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(PARCA) have gone a considerable distance towards establishing a taxonomy of the 
proximate causes of cost growth. Examples of root cause analyses sponsored by PARCA 
are Blickstein et al. (2011), Blickstein et al. (2012), and Diehl, Gould, and Lo (2012). 
Generally accepted conclusions have been reached on only a few topics. For 
example, there is a consensus that Total Package Procurement (TPP) and Fixed Price 
Development contracts are associated with high cost growth. There also seems to be a 
consensus that average cost growth of MDAPs has not increased or decreased across the 
past half century. More generally, there is widespread, although not unanimous, agreement 
that unrealistic assumptions embedded in MS B baselines are the largest source of cost 
growth. On many topics, however, the cost growth literature leaves considerable room for 
debate.  
The term Program Characteristics Model is used here as a label for the idea that 
program characteristics are a major source of cost growth.2 A general representation of this 
idea is the following: 
 Ch   ,… ,   . 
The dependent variable (ChPAUC) is the percentage change in Program Acquisition 
Unit Cost (PAUC), which is defined in the following section. CMSB is the MS B estimate of 
acquisition cost. The numerator [h(x1,…,xn)] is the actual cost the model projects based on 
program characteristics X = (x1,…,xn). 
In practice, studies of the extent to which program characteristics influenced cost 
growth require large amounts of often difficult to acquire data. They inevitably are imperfect 
because of gaps in the data and analytical issues. These problems are not important in the 
context of this paper, however.3 What we need is simply the representation of the idea that 
program characteristics drive a significant part of cost growth. 
The Funding Climate-Policy Model 
The model adopted by McNicol (2018b) is drawn from McNicol (2018a) (hereafter 
referred to as Acquisition Policy), which accepts the premise of the Program Characteristics 
Model: the proximate causes of a large portion of cost in MDAPs lie in unrealistic 
assumptions embedded in the MS B baseline. Viewed from this standpoint, the model in 
Acquisition Policy is placed one step upstream from previous cost growth studies. It 
                                            
 
 
2 Not all studies that fall under the heading “cost growth” were concerned with the links between 
program characteristics and cost growth. Some were concerned with the more modest problem of 
describing the main features of cost growth. Is cost growth markedly higher in one of the Services? 
Has cost growth increased over time? Others examined whether changes in acquisition policy and 
process led to improvements in MDAP outcomes over time, e.g., lower cost growth. 
3 It is worth noting that estimating a Program Characteristics Model statistically is effectively 
impossible because of the huge data requirements. Drezner et al. (1993) seems to be the only 
example of an attempt to do so. That study, however, used only six program characteristics and a 
measure of budget growth, and did not report the estimated equation. McNicol (2004) might be 
regarded as another example; however, it uses a hybrid of the Program Characteristics Model and 
what the study calls the Speeding Model of cost growth, plus several other variables inspired by cost 
analysis considerations.  
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examines root cause (i.e., causes of causes), where the Program Characteristics Model is 
concerned with the proximate causes of cost growth.  
For convenience, I will refer to the model developed in Acquisition Policy as the 
Funding Climate-Policy Model. This model is a version of the Speeding Model of cost growth 
introduced in McNicol (2004). The Speeding Model posits that all “drivers”—program 
managers (PMs) and the components who “own” the MDAPs—have some propensity to 
speed, that is, to adopt unrealistic assumptions about the performance of the system or 
unrealistic assumptions that reduce its apparent cost and/or EMD schedule. The other side 
of the Speeding Model is external constraints on speeding—speed limits backed up by the 
police, fines, and the courts. In the context of major system acquisition, that primarily means 
acquisition policy and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)–level oversight. 
From this line of thought, the Funding Climate-Policy Model distills two sets of 
variables to characterize cost growth due to Errors of Inception: funding climate (the 
surrogate for the intensity of competition for acquisition funds at MS B), and changes in 
acquisition policy. The model takes an ad hoc approach to the other two main sources of 
cost growth—Errors of Execution and Program Changes.  
The equation estimated is 
ChPAUCi = a0 + a1Climatei + a2DSARCi + a3PCDSARCi + a4DABi + a5ARi + a6Tboomi + a7Tbusti + ei. 
PAUC is acquisition cost (the sum of EMD and procurement cost) divided by the number of 
fully configured units acquired. PAUC growth is computed by comparing the MS B baseline 
value of PAUC—which can be thought of as a goal or a prediction—to the actual PAUC 
reported in the final Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) for the program. Both the MS B 
baseline and the final value4 of PAUC are stated in program base year dollars. The actual 
value is restated on the basis of the MS B baseline quantity by moving up or down the cost 
progress curve as appropriate. The ratio of the MS B baseline value of PAUC to the 
quantity-adjusted actual value is an estimate of what PAUC growth would have been had 
the MS B baseline quantity been acquired. 
Table 4 defines the categorical variables used in the study. The first of the 
acquisition policy bins (McNamara-Clifford) does not appear explicitly in the model because 
it is used as the reference category. Acquisition Policy identifies the factors used to establish 
the break points between bust and boom climates and the acquisition policy bins. 
  
                                            
 
 
4 For a program that is still underway, the most recent estimate (as reported in the SAR) of the final 
value was used. 
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Table 4. Categorical Variables of the Funding Climate-Policy Model 
Variable Short Name Period 
(Fiscal Years) 
Climate bust climates 1965–1982,  
1987–2002 
boom climates 1983–1987,  
2003–2008 
McNamara-Clifford McNamara-Clifford 1965–1969 
Defense System Acquisition Review Council DSARC 1970–1982 
Post-Carlucci DSARC PC DSARC 1983–1989 
Defense Acquisition Board DAB 1990–1993, 
2001–2009 
Acquisition Reform AR 1994–2000 
 
Finally, Tboomi and Tbusti are the numbers of years the ith program spent in boom and 
bust years, respectively. These provide a rough and ready way to capture PAUC growth due 
to Errors of Execution and Program Changes, which the model cannot distinguish. The term 
ei is a random variable that is assumed to have a constant mean and variance. 
Table  presents the estimated parameter values and their associated p-values.5 It is 
difficult to find anything to complain about in these results. Each of the estimated coefficients 
has the expected sign, and the estimated magnitudes are reasonable. All the coefficients 
from the Speeding Model are statistically significant at the 1% level or less, which is the 
most striking feature of the results. The estimated coefficient of Tboom is significant at about 
the 2% level. The estimated coefficient for Tbust is insignificant, which is consistent with prior 
expectations. About 26% of the variation in PAUC growth over the sample is accounted for 
by the model, which, for panel data without any lagged variables, is remarkably high. Of 
course, results like this never “prove” a model to be valid but, as in this case, they may fail to 
reject it. 
 
                                            
 
 
5 The p-value in this instance provides a test of the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients 
of the regression equation. The null hypothesis is that the true value of the coefficient is zero. The p-
value then is the probability of obtaining the estimate from a sample if its true value is zero. For 
example, the estimated coefficient of Tboom is 3.8%/yr. and the associate p-value is 0.021. This means 
that the odds of observing a coefficient for Tboom as large as 3.8%/yr. are about 2 in 100. 
Consequently, we reject the null hypothesis that the true value of the coefficient is zero. The border 
for statistical significance is generally set at 5% or sometimes 10%. Thus, an estimate coefficient with 
a p-value of 0.05 or less would be said to be “statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level.”  
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Table 5. Estimated Coefficients and p-Values for a Model That Includes 
the Effects of Post-MS B Funding Climate and Duration † 
 Coefficients p-value 
Intercept  73.1%*** < 0.001 
Errors of Inception—Intensity of Competition for Funds 
Funding Climate -28.7%*** 0.009 
Errors of Inception—Acquisition Policy 
DSARC -56.7%*** < 0.001 
PC DSARC  -50.3%*** 0.001 
DAB  -59.5%*** < 0.001 
AR  -80.2%*** < 0.001 
Errors of Execution and Program Changes 
Tboom 3.8%/yr** 0.021 
Tbust 0.59%/yr 0.515 
*** Statistically significant at less than the 1% level 
** Statistically significant at less than the 5% level 
R-Squared = 0.26, F = 7.02 (P < 0.001), N= 149. Estimated using OLS. Four programs 
that passed through two boom periods and the three mid-1980s MDAPs acquired 
using TPP-like contracts were omitted. Wald’s test for the equality of the estimated 
coefficients of the categorical variables for acquisition policy periods with the 
Bonferroni correction yields F= 1.43, p = 0.0.946. 
† Adapted from Table 16, page 38, of Acquisition Policy 
A More Complete Model and the Reduced Form Relationship 
The Program Characteristics Model and the Funding Climate-Policy Model were 
developed to answer different questions, so their differences may be tolerable. Still, it is 
awkward to have two models that address related questions, have the same dependent 
variable (cost growth of MDAPs), and different explanatory variables, a situation that cries 
out for an explanation. This section extracts one from a more complete high-level model of 
cost growth on MDAPs. A couple of pages are required to sketch the model. After that is 
done, the argument can be completed very quickly. 
The first relationship in the model describes the results of the PM’s judgment of what 
the cost for the program must be for it to be funded. (The PM’s superiors may be involved, 
but that fact is not important for the purposes of this exercise.) Note that the context is a 
specific program coming up for MS B review in a particular Program Objective Memorandum 
(POM) cycle. No assumption about how the PM makes their judgment is required, but it is 
worth noting that the problem is intrinsically one of constrained optimization. The PM wants 
the highest cost that will provide a solid chance that the program will be funded. The cost 
that the PM decides is needed is denoted by C*. The variable marking the intensity of 
competition is denoted by W, and the restrictions (that is, acquisition policies) that the PM 
believes must be observed are denoted by R. We assume that 
 C* = f(W, R) , (1) 
and assume further that C* decreases as competition for funds (W) becomes more 
intense. The question of how to measure W is set aside here.  
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The next part of the model represents the choice of program characteristics to be 
changed as necessary to get apparent cost down to C*. Recall that the relevant program 
characteristics are denoted by X = (x1,…,xn). By departing from realistic values for any of the 
program characteristics, the PM creates some risk for the program. The problem is to select 
values for the program characteristics that reduce cost to C* at minimum risk, but this may 
not be a hard problem. Suppose that the PM, with the assistance of the program office staff, 
can assign the xis to risk bands—say low, medium, and high. The assignments would be 
made in terms of the perceived risks to the program of departing from the realistic or best 
practice value of the characteristic. The reduction in the apparent cost of the program also is 
associated with each of the xis. The least risk solution is then found by reading down the list 
until the cost estimate for the program cost reaches C*.  
This approach assumes that the risk of setting one program feature at an unrealistic 
level is not affected by the choices made for other program features. For example, the 
assumption would be that the risk entailed by procuring an unrealistically small quantity of 
initial spares is not affected by assuming an unrealistically early start for operational testing. 
In fact, these two elements of risk are intertwined.6 Consequently, most would model this 
decision as a problem of picking the values of program characteristics X to minimize some 
measure of program risk M given C, and subject to the interactions of program risks and 
restriction R imposed on the program office. The solution to this problem is a relationship 
(known as an “efficient frontier”) between the risk measure M and the cost achieved, C. 
Each point on the curve of this relationship is associated with a particular set of program 
characteristics that achieves the cost C at minimum risk, given R and the interdependencies 
of program risks. In this simple model,7 the bundle of program characteristics accepted is 
that which gives C*. This solution can be written: 
 x∗ = gi(C*, R), i = 1,…, n , (2) 
where x∗ is the value of the ith program characteristic given by the solution to the 
optimization problem.  
Many will balk at the apparent implication that PMs and their staffs literally solve the 
optimization problem sketched above. Especially during the early years of a program, the 
volume of work that a program office must do and the rapid pace of events are such that 
spending the time required to optimize any one decision probably would be, well, not optimal 
for a program office. Consequently, on many decisions that must be made, PMs and 
program offices live in the land of “good enough.” Of course, PMs and program office staffs 
are professional and knowledgeable and work at solving problems, so the solutions they 
develop generally are sound. The essential assumption, however, is not that the decisions 
made are near-optimal. Rather, in the context of the model, the essential assumption is that 
the PM’s decisions on program characteristics respond to changes in external events—
                                            
 
 
6 The simple approach may still be viable if the interdependencies are few enough and simple 
enough. 
7 The first of many refinements of the model would replace Equation (1) with a relationship that 
characterizes the PM’s willingness to trade off two categories of risks: (a) risk that the program will 
not be funded because it is perceived as being unaffordable; and (b) latent risks to the program 
created by adoption of unrealistic values for some program characteristics.  
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especially the intensity of competition for funds and restrictions that they must observe—in 
the same way as the optimal solution. The statistical analysis does not “see” departures 
from optimality. What it sees are the responses to changes in relevant external conditions—
funding climate and acquisition policies—and the model is rejected if these responses 
depart significantly from what it predicts.  
The final relationship in the model is just the Program Characteristics Model of cost 
growth: 
 Cf – CMSB = h(x1,…,xn) . (3) 
Cf is what the acquisition cost of the program finally turned out to be (adjusted to the 
MS B quantity and stated in program base-year dollars), excluding cost growth due to Errors 
of Execution and Program Changes. CMSB is the acquisition cost projected at MS B (which 
always tacitly assumes no Errors of Execution or Program Changes). Note also that the xis 
are consistent with the MS B baseline and the CARD (which ideally are consistent with one 
another). 
The remainder of the argument is just a matter of substituting Equation (1) into 
Equation (2) and the result into Equation (3). The first of these steps yields: 
 x∗ = gi(f(W,R), R) ≡ Gi(W,R),     i = 1,…, n . (4) 
Note that Gi(W,R) is simply a renaming adopted to cut down on notational clutter. 
Substitution of Equation (4) into the Program Characteristics Model, Equation (3), gives: 
 Cf – CMSB = h(G1(W,R), … , Gn(W, R)) ≡ H(W,R) . (5a) 
Now divide by the MS B PAUC and use the original form of the Program 
Characteristics Model (Equation (3)): 
  Ch   ,… ,   ,  . (5b) 
It is obvious in Equation (5b) that the Funding Climate-Policy Model is simply the 
reduced form of the Program Characteristics Model. 
An elaboration of the model sketched here—for example, incorporation of 
uncertainty—is unlikely to change the result just stated. What could change it is 
incorporation into the model of an additional feature of the acquisition process. Thinking 
along these lines, the first place to look would be the OSD-level acquisition review process. 
The policy variable R was defined as the set of acquisition policies that the PM believes 
must be observed. That is, the model tacitly assumes that the PM knows with certainty 
which policy restrictions require compliance. A PM, of course, never knows for sure how 
rigorously the applicable policies will be enforced. 
A surface read of this observation is that it points to an elaboration of the model. The 
real point, however, is that the Funding Climate-Policy Model largely is irrelevant unless 
there is significant porosity in the OSD-level oversight process. Within the logic of the model, 
more intense competition for funds is an incentive for PMs to propose programs that have 
unrealistically optimistic and unreasonably risky characteristics. But to the extent that OSD-
level reviews lead to the rejection of unrealistic elements in proposed programs, the 
programs that emerge from the review are realistic and are risky only within the bounds of 
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existing policy. All of the x∗ of Equation (4) are then determined by policy restrictions (R), 
and funding climate has no effect. For funding climate to have an effect, it must be that a PM 
can, at some risk, violate some of the rules some of the time or that there are major gaps in 
the rules. 
Conclusion 
To repeat, the question that motivated this paper was: Why did I not include program 
characteristics as variables in the Funding Climate-Policy Model? One answer is that doing 
so would contradict the specifications of both models. A better answer is that including 
program characteristics in a Funding Climate-Policy model would answer no question. The 
studies that employ the Program Characteristics Model of cost growth are intended to 
provide good housekeeping guidance on how to structure MDAPs. The Funding Climate-
Policy Model is concerned with explaining why the DoD does not always follow the dictates 
of policy and prudence in laying out major acquisition programs. Including program 
characteristics in a Funding Climate-Policy model would produce results that, regardless of 
the estimated test statistics, cannot be interpreted in terms of the question either model is 
intended to address. 
Some might respond that it is reasonable to test the Funding Climate-Policy Model 
against alternatives. There is of course nothing wrong with doing that. It is not 
accomplished, however, by simply including one or more program characteristics in a 
Funding Climate-Policy Model. It would be necessary to formulate carefully the two models 
to be compared, and design a good way to distinguish them. Certainly the most direct—and 
probably the best—way to test the model sketched here is to estimate Equation (4) for 
several program characteristics over an interval of time long enough to include both bust 
and boom funding climates and some significant changes in acquisition policies.  
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